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Abstract: The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics concerns the relationship between 
an agent’s free actions and her moral obligations. The actualist affirms, while the 
possibilist denies, that facts about what agents would freely do in certain circumstances 
partly determines that agent’s moral obligations. This paper assesses the plausibility of 
actualism and possibilism in light of desiderata about accounts of blameworthiness. This 
paper first argues that actualism cannot straightforwardly accommodate certain very 
plausible desiderata before offering a few independent solutions on behalf of the 
actualist. This paper then argues that, contrary to initial appearances, possibilism is 
subject to its own comparably troubling blameworthiness problem.  
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I. Introduction  
 
The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics concerns the relationship between an agent’s 
free actions and her moral obligations.1 The core disagreement between these views is over 
whether an agent’s free actions, in certain circumstances, at least partly determine her moral 
obligations. Actualists claim they do, while possibilists claim they do not. Although this debate 
intersects with questions of agency and moral responsibility (e.g. Are there true counterfactuals 
of freedom?, Which of the agent’s relevant act alternatives does blame track?), the more than 
forty year old literature contains shockingly little discussion of these issues. This is regrettable, 
in part, because the answers to questions about agency and responsibility bear directly on the 
plausibility of the views on offer in the actualism/possibilism debate and vice versa. This paper 
helps bridge that gap in the literature by assessing the plausibility of actualism and possibilism in 
light of desiderata about accounts of blameworthiness.  
 
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide a brief overview of the 
actualism/possibilism debate in ethics, defining each view and illustrating exactly how they 
come apart by considering a standard case from the literature. In section three, we argue that 
standard forms of actualism are unable to straightforwardly accommodate a widely accepted, and 
exceedingly plausible, desideratum for accounts of blameworthiness. We refer to this as 
Actualism’s Blameworthiness Problem. We then offer two solutions on behalf of the actualist in 
sections four and five, showing how their view can, and should, be developed to avoid this 
problem. In section six, we show that actualism also has a prima facie problem providing a 
plausible account of blameworthiness for the outcomes of actions. We then offer a solution on 
                                                 
1 This paper is the product of full and equal collaboration between its authors.  
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behalf of the actualist. Finally, in section seven, we make a negative argument on behalf of the 
actualist by showing how possibilism is subject to its own, comparably troubling, 
blameworthiness problem. If our arguments succeed, they should collectively provide good 
reason to accept our suggested actualist strategies over alternative views.  
 
II. An Overview of the Actualism/Possibilism Debate  
 
It is uncontroversial among normative ethicists that the deontic status of an act depends 
upon the alternative acts available to the agent. As the actualism/possibilism debate illustrates, 
however, views about which acts are the relevant alternatives available to an agent are 
contentious. To get a grip on this abstract issue, consider the following first-order case.  
  
The Gig: Brandi has been invited by her friend, Chad Kroeger, to attend his musical gig 
at a local bar. Brandi can easily decide to attend the gig, and then decide at the gig to be 
supportive of Chad, which would be the best outcome. Unfortunately, Chad is a terrible 
musician. Consequently, Brandi would not in fact decide to be supportive of Chad if she 
decided to attend his gig due to being irritated with Chad’s performance—even though 
she could decide at the gig to be supportive.2 Since Chad would be deeply hurt, this 
would be the worst outcome. Brandi could alternatively decide not to attend Chad’s gig, 
which would be better than the worst outcome, yet worse than the best outcome.3  
 
To be sure, Brandi can decide to attend the gig, and once there decide to be supportive of 
Chad. However, suppose that just isn’t what Brandi would do if she were to attend. Here’s the 
tricky philosophical question. Is Brandi morally obligated to accept or decline the invitation? 
Actualists hold that Brandi is obligated to decline because what would actually happen if she 
declines is better than what would actually happen if she accepts (Goldman 1976; Sobel 1976; 
Jackson and Pargetter 1986). Possibilists hold that Brandi is obligated to accept because 
accepting is part of the best possible sequence of acts that Brandi can perform (Greenspan 1978; 
Feldman 1986; Zimmerman (1996: § 6); Zimmerman 2017).  
 
While there is a variety of more precise technical formulations of these views on offer, 
we settle on what we take to be the most plausible versions of each view. This makes no 
difference to our arguments, however, since the issues we raise apply to the less precise, less 
plausible, definitions as well. We focus on two distinct formulations of actualism and one 
formulation of possibilism. First, consider a version of actualism that does not take into account 
which acts are under an agent’s control at which times.    
 
                                                 
2 Purely for ease of presentation, we describe the actualist/possibilist cases in a way that implicitly assumes both counterfac tual 
determinism and compatibilism. These assumptions are unnecessary for the purposes of our argument. Readers should feel free to 
amend the cases to be libertarian-friendly by replacing the “would” counterfactuals with “might” counterfactuals, where the agent 
is very likely to freely act in the way described. Those who reject counterfactual determinism can imagine that, instead of each of 
the agent’s actions corresponding to a unique possible world, each of the agent’s actions corresponds to a probability distribution 
of possible worlds that might be actualized if the agent performs the act in question.  
3 This example is drawn from Cohen and Timmerman (2016: 1). It is structurally identical to standard Professor Procrastinate-
cases from the literature. These types of cases appear throughout the literature, including Goldman (1978), Jackson and Pargetter 
(1986: 235), Vorobej (2000: 131-2), Portmore (2011: 180), and Timmerman (2015: 1512).  
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Actualism (without a control condition): At t an agent S is obligated to φ at t' (where t 
may or may not be identical to t') iff S can φ at t' and what would happen if S were to φ at 
t' is better than what would happen if S were to perform any incompatible act-set S can 
perform at t.4  
 
The earliest versions of actualism were formulated without a control condition5, but have 
become much less popular since such versions were shown to incur a unique set of problems.6 
To see how this version of actualism works, imagine that it is presently under Brandi’s control to 
<accept the invitation and be supportive of Chad>. Nevertheless, it is true that Brandi wouldn’t 
be supportive if she attends. A version of actualism without a control condition entails that 
Brandi is obligated to decline the invitation to the gig because what would happen if she declines 
is better than what would happen if she performs any incompatible act she can at the time in 
question (i.e. accept the invitation). This implication also illustrates one of the supposed 
problems with such versions of actualism. It is counterintuitive to hold that Brandi is obligated to 
decline the invitation if it’s currently under her control to ensure that she does something much 
better, viz. both accept the invitation and be supportive. While such versions of actualism are 
admittedly subject to unique problems, as we demonstrate in the next section, they also allow for 
a unique benefit as well. Currently, the most popular forms of actualism include a control 
condition and focus on maximal acts. They may be formulated as follows. The underlined words 
highlight the differences between this formulation and the previous one.  
 
Actualism (with a control condition): At t an agent S morally ought to φ at t' (where t 
may or may not be identical to t') iff φ-ing at t' is an act-set currently under S’s control at 
t, and what would happen if S were to φ at t' is better than what would happen if S were to 
perform any incompatible maximal act-set under S’s control at t.7,8 
 
                                                 
4 As is standard in the literature, we formulate actualism and possibilism in terms of one’s objective, rather than one’s subjective, 
obligations. Roughly, an objective obligation is what an agent should do if she were aware of all of the normatively relevant 
facts. A subjective obligation, by contrast, is what a conscientious moral agent should do, relative to the evidence in her epistemic 
ken (cf. Zimmerman (1996: 10-20); Portmore (2011: 12-23)). To keep the dialectic as simple as possible, unless we state 
otherwise, we’ll assume that the agents in the cases we give know all of the normatively relevant facts. This means that the 
agent’s subjective and objective obligations are identical in such cases.  
5 See, for instance, Goldman (1976), Sobel (1976), and Jackson and Pargetter (1986).  
6 For discussions of seminal objections to actualism, see Wedgwood (2009), Baker (2012: 642-43), and Zimmerman (2017: § 2). 
See also Cariani (2016: 409-410) and Timmerman and Cohen (2016: 674).  
7 Actualism without a control condition violates the principle of normative inheritance Portmore (2019: ch. 4) and it generates 
conflicting obligations without saying which obligation takes priority Cohen and Timmerman (2016: 11-12), Kiesewetter (2015: 
929-934), and Portmore (2011: 181-183). Subsequent versions of actualism built in a control condition and focus on maximal act-
sets to avoid this problem. See, for instance, Goldman (1978: 202), Carlson (1995: 121-23), Bykvist (2002: 61-64), and Jackson 
(2014). Douglas Portmore’s (2011) and Jacob Ross’s (2012) securitist views also count as versions of actualism for the purposes 
of this paper.  
8 One might worry that we should not define actualism in a manner that assumes both consequentialism and that one ought to 
perform the best action available. (The same worry might apply to our account of possibilism below.) We make these 
assumptions,which are common in the literature on actualism, only for simplicity’s sake. The intuitive thought behind actualism 
is that one should hold fixed what would result from one’s action when deciding what one ought to do. But turning this thought 
into an account of right action is quite complicated without our simplifying assumptions. We think that actualists who reject these 
assumptions will nonetheless agree with our judgments about permissibility in the cases we appeal to below. So rejecting the 
simplifying assumptions should not undermine our argument. 
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To see how this version of actualism works, imagine again that it is presently under 
Brandi’s control to <accept the invitation and be supportive of Chad>, but that it is not presently 
under her control to do anything more specific than that, including doing anything after the time 
at which she can support, or not support, Chad. As we’re using the term, then, <accepting the 
invitation and being supportive of Chad> is a maximal act-set because it is an act-set that is 
among the set of the most precise act-sets that Brandi can currently ensure she performs. More 
formally, an act-set ∝j is maximal at time t iff there is no other set of actions ∝i under the agent’s 
control at t, such that performing ∝i involves performing ∝j, but not vice versa.9 Now, suppose 
that the maximal act-sets under S’s control are <accept the invitation and be supportive of 
Chad>, <accept the invitation and not be supportive of Chad>, and <decline the invitation and 
not interact with Chad>. The non-maximal acts under Brandi’s control are each of the conjuncts 
in the maximal act-sets. In a nutshell, when these are the maximal act-sets, actualism with a 
control condition entails that Brandi is obligated to <accept the invitation> because the best 
maximal act-set is <accept the invitation and be supportive of Chad> and bringing about that 
outcome requires that Brandi <accept the invitation>.  
  
 Actualism with a control condition will render a different verdict if it is not currently 
under Brandi’s control to <accept the invitation and be supportive of Chad>. To illustrate, let’s 
suppose that no matter what Brandi intends to do now, she would freely choose to not be 
supportive of Chad if she attends the gig. In this case, the maximal act-sets presently under 
Brandi’s control are only <accept the invitation and not be supportive of Chad> and <decline the 
invitation and not interact with Chad>. Of these two alternatives, the best act-set is <decline the 
invitation and not interact with Chad>. Consequently, in this scenario, actualism with a control 
condition would entail that Brandi is obligated to <decline the invitation> because the best 
maximal act-set is <decline the invitation and not interact with Chad> and bringing about that 
outcome requires that Brandi <decline the invitation>. We will come back to the differences 
between the two standard versions of actualism in section IV. Finally, let’s consider the standard 
form of possibilism.   
 
Possibilism: At t an agent S is obligated to φ at t' (where t may or may not be identical to 
t') iff φ-ing at t' is part of the best series of acts that S can perform from t to the last 
moment that, at t, S can possibly perform an act. 
 
So, according to possibilism, Brandi is obligated to <accept the invitation> regardless of 
whether it is currently under her control to be supportive if she attends. This is simply because 
the best act-set she can, at t, perform is <accept the invitation and be supportive of Chad> and 
bringing about that outcome requires that Brandi <accept the invitation>. With these definitions 
in mind, we turn to the problem that blame presents for the actualist.  
 
 
                                                 
9 This definition is borrowed from Portmore (2011: 177) and Portmore (2019). Jacob Ross employs this concept in his (2012), 
which he refers to as a “maximally specific option.” There may be no maximally specific act-sets if, for any act-set an agent can 
perform, there is an infinite number of more precise ways they could perform that act-set. Although actualism and possibilism 
can easily be reformulated to accommodate this possibility (e.g. by discussing maximally specific morally relevant act-sets), we 
think doing so is unnecessary because actual agents lack the dexterity to perform infinitely precise variations of any act-set.  
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III. Actualism’s Blameworthiness Problem  
 
 There are very few axioms about blame that are uncontroversial. Yet, the proposition that 
an agent is blameless if she has, relative to her evidence, done what was morally required of her 
for morality’s own sake has a great deal of intuitive support. Many would agree that one is 
blameless for performing an act if (i) that act was subjectively morally permissible, (ii) the agent 
was motivated to perform the act for the right reasons (e.g. because it was the subjectively moral 
thing to do), and (iii) the agent was not motivated to perform the act for any of the wrong reasons 
(e.g. because it would harm an innocent person). Conditions (i)-(iii) appear to be jointly 
sufficient, but perhaps not necessary, conditions for merit-based blamelessness for performing an 
act.10 Given its extreme intuitive plausibility,11 both normative ethical views and accounts of 
blameworthiness should want to accommodate some version of this desideratum, which we will 
refer to as the Blameless Desideratum (BD). BD may be formulated more precisely as follows. 
  
Blameless Desideratum (BD): Agent S is blameless for φ-ing if φ-ing is itself 
subjectively permissible and if S φs for all the right reasons and does not φ for any of the 
wrong reasons.12  
 
The problem for actualism is that standard forms appear unable to straightforwardly 
accommodate BD without committing themselves to deeply implausible consequences. To 
illustrate, consider the case of Gamer Gabi.   
 
Gamer Gabi: Gabi has exactly $500 in her account and initially planned to use it to 
purchase the latest and greatest tablet tomorrow. Unless Gabi spends the $500 on herself 
today, she will face the following choice tomorrow: use the $500 to save three innocent 
lives or purchase a tablet. It is not presently under Gabi’s control to <keep the money in 
her account today and use the money to save the three lives tomorrow>. However, it is 
presently under her control to <keep the money in her account today>. Moreover, if she 
does keep the money in her account today, then it would be under her control tomorrow 
to <use the money to save the three lives>. At that point, all she has to do is to intend to 
use the $500 to save the three lives. That’s just not what she would do if she finds herself 
in that situation. Finally, suppose that Gabi is aware of these facts and consequently 
decides to purchase a tablet for herself today rather than tomorrow. She does so with the 
intention of avoiding any wrongdoing.13  
                                                 
10 We are not claiming, of any particular condition, that it is necessary for blamelessness. We also leave open that some subset of 
these conditions are sufficient for blamelessness. We also leave open the possibility that agents can deserve blame for something 
other than the performance of acts (e.g. having certain dispositions to act).  
11  Many philosophers hold than one can be blameworthy only for wrong acts. For a recent defense of this view see Montminy 
(2018). But even philosophers who hold that agents can be blameworthy for performing permissible acts say that such agents are 
blameworthy because they act for bad reasons or from bad motives (see Zimmerman (1997) and Capes (2012)). Thus BD is on 
solid footing. There is one motivation for rejecting BD in the literature: the claim that blameworthiness can trace back to 
previous bad choices. This will be discussed in section V. 
12 BD is meant to be a plausible axiom for merit-based views of blame, not for consequentialist views of blame. There will 
certainly be cases where BD is satisfied, yet an agent ought to be blamed for consequentialist reasons and vice versa.  
13 This example is drawn from Timmerman (2015: 1516-1517) and Timmerman and Cohen (2016: 677). Those concerned about 
moral fetishism or schizophrenia may interpret Gabi’s motivations to be too close to the motivations of the hospital visitor from 
Stocker (1976: 462) to fully satisfy BD. If Gabi is purely motivated by a de dicto desire to do good, then one may worry that she 
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Both versions of actualism suggest (assuming plausible claims about the extent of one’s 
duties to aid others) that Gabi acts wrongly if she purchases a tablet tomorrow (rather than saving 
the three lives tomorrow), but acts permissibly if she purchases a tablet today (rather than saving 
the money to save the three lives tomorrow). So coupled with BD, both versions of actualism 
suggest that Gabi is blameless for purchasing a tablet today, but could be blameworthy for 
purchasing one tomorrow.14 This seems to be the incorrect result. At a minimum, Gabi seems to 
be equally blameworthy (or blameless) whether she purchases a tablet today or tomorrow. 
Moreover, it is intuitive to hold that Gabi is deserving of blame if she purchases a tablet today or 
tomorrow because it remains true of Gabi, both today and tomorrow, that she can abstain from 
acquiring a trivial good for herself in order to save three lives.15  
 
Actualism’s problem with accommodating BD stems from the fact that, according to 
actualism, an agent’s blameworthy behavior in counterfactual situations is explanatorily prior to 
some of the agent’s moral obligations. Stated over simplistically, according to actualism, the fact 
that an agent would perform a blameworthy immoral act in a given situation often allows the 
agent to avoid incurring an obligation to do the best she can in said situation. In Gamer Gabi, the 
fact that Gabi would culpably act immorally when faced with the opportunity to spend $500 to 
save three lives allows her to avoid incurring an obligation to use her $500 to save the three 
lives. Specifically, the fact that she would culpably act wrongly if she were in that situation 
factors into the evaluative ranking of purchasing a tablet today and, since Gabi would not save 
the three lives tomorrow if she has the opportunity, actualism entails that Gabi is not obligated to 
keep the money in her account today. 
 
 If it were true, however, that Gabi would save the three lives tomorrow were she to have 
the $500, then actualism would entail that Gabi is obligated to keep the money in her account 
today and use it tomorrow the save the three lives. So, Gabi’s blameworthy immoral behavior of 
failing to save the three lives is explanatorily prior to her obligations to keep (or not keep) the 
money in her account today. This already seems to many to be implausible. But it is even more 
implausible if the agent’s dispositions to do wrong also allows them to avoid blame. This 
problem can be most clearly be seen by considering a variation of a case from Zimmerman’s 
(2017: 121).  
 
Torturing Tammy: Tammy likes to torture. She’s just captured a stray cat and is 
wondering what she ought to do with him. She can easily let him go and refrain from 
                                                 
would not be acting for all the right reasons. See Smith (1994: 74-75) for a defense of this idea. In response, we will first note 
that we are unconvinced by these arguments against de dicto moral motivation, partly for reasons given in Shafer-Landau (1998) 
and Carbonell (2013). Providing a refutation of these arguments is beyond the scope of this paper, however. Second, while Gabi 
certainly is motivated by the good de dicto, she may be motivated by the good de re as well, at least within an actualist 
framework.  
14 BD is formulated as a principle governing subjective permissibility and, as we have formulated it, actualism is a principle 
governing objective permissibility. But we think that any plausible formulation of subjective actualism will yield the result that, 
since she is aware of the relevant facts, Gabi acts subjectively wrongly if she purchases a tablet tomorrow, but acts subjectively 
permissibly if she purchases a tablet today. So the problem will still emerge. The same goes for the Torturing Tammy case 
discussed below. 
15 This intuition seems to us to be widely held among actualists and non-actualists alike. Anyone who lacks this intuition, 
however, poses no problem for the actualist since those who lack it will not think actualism has a blameworthiness problem.  
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torturing any animal from here on out. If she lets him go, however, she would later 
choose to capture him again and torture him for ten minutes. If she instead tortures him 
for five minutes now, she will choose to not capture him or torture him again. Knowing 
this and wanting to avoid any wrongdoing, Tammy tortures the cat for five minutes. 
     
 According to both types of actualism (when combined with any plausible normative 
ethical theory), Tammy is obligated to torture the cat for five minutes, even though (the actualist 
agrees) she can simply not torture the cat at all. The fact that Tammy would culpably act wrongly 
if she doesn’t now torture the cat is explanatorily prior to her incurring an obligation to torture 
the cat for five minutes. So, assuming BD, Tammy may then be blameless for torturing the cat 
for five minutes even though she could have simply not tortured it at all.  
 
 There may be an additional worry for the actualist here. Suppose Tammy’s act of 
torturing the cat now is highly self-sacrificial. She would be horrified by the experience of 
torturing the cat now, but, in a different mood, would highly enjoy it later. She decides to have 
the horrifying experience now in order to minimize the total suffering of the cat. In this scenario, 
there may be pressure on the actualist to say that Tammy is praiseworthy for torturing the cat 
now. After all, she did the right thing for the right reasons, at great personal cost to herself. This 
seems like an even worse result.16 
 
To recap, Torturing Tammy and Gamer Gabi are instances of Actualism’s 
Blameworthiness Problem. They show that actualism coupled with BD seemingly generates 
extremely counterintuitive results. Actualism gets these results because it makes agents’  potential 
blameworthy behavior explanatorily prior to their moral obligations. The most straightforward 
ways to avoid these problems is by either rejecting actualism or by rejecting BD outright. Our 
goal, however, is to do neither. Rather, we offer the best defenses available to the actualist that, 
in spite of initial appearances, allows them to accommodate BD (or something very close to it) 
and keep the essential components of their view intact. In the next two sections, we will offer 
two defenses on behalf of the actualist.  
 
IV. First Solution: Adopt A Contextualist Form of Actualism  
 
 One way actualism can accommodate BD without generating counterintuitive 
consequences is by finding a way to identify (subjective) wrongdoing in Gamer Gabi and 
Torturing Tammy cases within the actualist framework. This may seem impossible since 
actualism affirms that Tammy is obligated to torture the cat for five minutes and denies that Gabi 
is obligated to keep the money in her account to save the three lives tomorrow. Despite initial 
appearances, however, this task is indeed possible. The actualist can identify (subjective) 
                                                 
16 Thanks to Justin Coates for pointing out this possibility to us. A referee suggested the possibility that perhaps 
Tammy is not praiseworthy full stop, but only “praiseworthy in comparison” (perhaps this just means less 
blameworthy) to what her moral status would have been had she instead performed the worse act  of torturing later. 
The worry, as we see it, is that the actualist doesn’t have a good explanation of why Tammy isn’t praiseworthy full 
stop. She engages in significant self-sacrifice in order to act rightly for the right reasons. What more is required for 
praiseworthiness? But if the referee’s suggestion is correct the praiseworthiness worry is avoided. Since our goal is 
to defend actualism, we would be happy with this result. 
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wrongdoing within an actualist framework by positing a plurality of actualist “oughts,” where at 
least one of those oughts entails that agents act wrongly in Gamer Gabi and Torturing Tammy-
style cases. We will refer to such views as contextualist actualism. The basic idea is that, in 
addition to standard salient actualist obligations, agents have actualist obligations to perform the 
best act-set they can over the course of their life. We will refer to this actualist obligation as a 
lifetime actualist obligation. Agents will necessarily violate this lifetime actualist obligation in 
any case structurally identical to Gamer Gabi or Torturing Tammy. Frank Jackson and Robert 
Pargetter (1986) developed and defended the best version of contextualist actualism, which may 
be formulated as follows.17 
 
Contextualist Actualism (CA): whether S ought to φ at t depends on whether φ-ing at t 
is better than what S would do if S does not φ at t. But what S ought to do at t is 
whichever of the maximally relevantly specific options available to S at t would have the 
best outcome.18    
 
To better understand how CA identifies (subjective) wrongdoing, consider its assessment 
of Torturing Tammy and, to keep the case as simple as possible, assume that Tammy will suffer 
an inevitable death immediately after the time at which she can torture or not torture animals. 
Whether Tammy ought to torture the cat for five minutes depends on whether torturing the cat 
for five minutes is better than what Tammy would do if she were to not torture the cat for five 
minutes. Since Tammy would torture the cat for ten minutes if she doesn’t torture it for five, it 
follows that Tammy ought to torture the cat for five minutes. This commitment of CA is simply 
a salient standard actualist verdict.  
 
Now, consider the second part of the definition. What Tammy ought to do is completely 
refrain from torturing the cat since that is the maximally relevantly specific option available to 
her that would have the best outcome. That is simply the best thing that Tammy can do over the 
course of her life. To be sure, as Jackson and Pargetter were conceiving of CA, what an agent 
ought to do is co-extensive with the possibilist obligation.19 Nevertheless, this ought does admit 
of an actualist justification. After all, what would actually happen if Tammy were to 
<completely refrain from torturing the cat> is better than what would actually happen if Tammy 
were <not to completely refrain from torturing the cat> or to do anything else at the times in 
question. Thus, what Tammy ought to do is not torture the cat at all and she ought to do this for 
actualist reasons.20  
                                                 
17 For another version of contextualist actualism, see McKinsey’s (1979).  
18 Our formulation of Jackson and Pargetter’s position is borrowed from Ross’s (2013: 76). 
19 Those who prefer a version of actualism with a control condition will hold that the maximally relevantly specific option 
available to S is identical to this actualist obligation, rather than the possibilist obligation. Such actualists do not regard the 
possibilist obligation as a relevant option for the agent when it is not currently under the agent’s control to ensure that she fulfills 
the possibilist obligation.  
20 The careful reader will notice that actualism (without a control condition), as formulated, is consistent with CA. It even enta ils 
something close to CA since it contains no restrictions on which act-sets can stand in for “φ” or what times can stand in for “t'”. To 
illustrate, in Torturing Tammy, when φ denotes <torturing the cat for five minutes> and t' denotes the five minutes Tammy would 
torture the cat, actualism without a control condition entails that Tammy ought to <torture the cat for five minutes>. However, 
when φ denotes <completely refraining from torturing the cat> and t' refers to the remaining time in her life, actualism without a 
control condition entails that tammy ought to <completely refrain from torturing the cat>. On the other hand, actualism (with a 
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CA renders a similar verdict in Gamer Gabi cases. Whether Gabi ought to keep the 
money in her account today depends on whether doing so would result in a better outcome than 
spending the money on a tablet today. It wouldn’t since Gabi wouldn’t use the money to save 
the three lives regardless of her choice today. So, we can suppose that each outcome is equally 
good, which means that the whether-ought doesn’t favor either action. What Gabi ought to do, 
however, is to <keep the money in her account today and use the money to save the three lives 
tomorrow>. By purchasing a tablet today, Gabi violates her (subjective) lifetime actualist 
obligation and so fails to meet BD’s sufficient conditions for blamelessness. Gabi may then be 
blameworthy for purchasing a tablet today and just as blameworthy for purchasing one today as 
for purchasing one tomorrow. This is the correct result. After all, whether she purchases a tablet 
today, or tomorrow, she will violate the same moral obligation (i.e. her lifetime actualist 
obligation) and will bring about an equally bad outcome (i.e. three innocent deaths). 
 
As these cases illustrate, adopting CA allows the actualist to accommodate BD without 
generating the incorrect verdicts in Gamer Gabi and Torturing Tammy cases. This is an 
overlooked advantage of CA. But it may not be enough to attract many actualist converts for a 
few reasons. First, if blameworthiness tracks the lifetime actualist obligation, then CA’s account 
of blame may be identical to the possibilist’s account of blame. As we will demonstrate in 
section seven, there are plausible reasons to reject that blame tracks the lifetime actualist 
obligation, reasons that actualists are likely disposed to accept.  
 
Second, CA fails to be action-guiding because it generates conflicting moral oughts and 
furthermore is silent about which ought takes priority. Although CA holds that Tammy ought to 
<torture the cat for five minutes>, CA also holds that Tammy ought to <refrain from torturing 
the cat altogether>. These incompatible actions prescribed by CA seem to put Tammy in an 
action dilemma (and perhaps a blame dilemma). Jackson recognized this worry in his (2014), 
but argued that there is no action dilemma because, at any given time, agents can only act in 
accordance with the whether-ought. They cannot ensure that they act in accordance with the 
what-ought when it concerns actions not under the agent’s control at the time in question (2014: 
636). The takeaway is that Jackson identifies the whether-ought as the action-guiding one.  
 
Jackson’s response is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, designating the whether-
ought as the action-guiding one entails that the agent will violate her what-ought prescriptions 
whenever they conflict with her whether-ought prescriptions. Most actualists will want to deny 
that agents have action-guiding moral obligations that require them to perform wrong actions.  
Second, notice that CA also generates conflicting obligations when applied to synchronic and 
diachronic act-sets, where performing each possible act-set is under the agent’s control at the 
time in question. In such cases, the agent will be able to act in accordance with either mutually 
exclusive ought at the time in question, yet (as formulated) CA still doesn’t say which one takes 
priority. Following Jackson’s (2014), the reader might infer that the whether-ought takes priority 
in such cases. But that would be deeply counterintuitive because acting in accordance with the 
what-ought guarantees that the agent acts in accordance with each of her moral oughts, while 
                                                 
control condition) is inconsistent with CA. Since it compares the goodness of the act in question to alternative maximal act-sets, it 
will never generate conflicting actualist oughts.  
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acting in accordance with the whether-ought in such cases ensures that one violates the what-
ought prescriptions. Thus, in cases where it is presently under the agent’s control to fulfill both 
the whether-ought and the what-ought prescriptions, it seems that the what-ought should take 
priority. This is because, in those cases, fulfilling either ought will presently be under the agent’s 
control and only fulfilling the what-ought guarantees that the agent acts in accordance with each 
of the moral oughts. 
  
Of course, proponents of CA could designate the whether-ought as action-guiding when 
it’s not presently under the agent’s control to fulfill the what-ought prescription and designate 
the what-ought as action-guiding in whenever it is presently under the agent’s control to act in 
accordance with it. Though seemingly ad hoc, it may be a promising strategy for CA, but one 
that we don’t expect to be dialectically effective against actualists who prefer a formulation with 
a control condition. In light of these considerations, in the next section, we develop another way 
for such actualists to be accommodate BD without generating intuitively incorrect verdicts in 
Gamer Gabi and Torturing Tammy cases.   
 
V. Second Solution: Appeal to Tracing  
 
A second option for the actualist is to reject BD as formulated, but to sugar the pill by 
positing an alternative, not-implausible, principle in its place.  We think this is a promising 
strategy because philosophers have provided independent motivation for an alternative position, 
appealing to reasons that are entirely independent of actualism. Specifically, many philosophers 
accept the idea that one can be blameworthy for an act that can be traced back to a previous 
blameworthy choice.21 To illustrate, consider this case.   
 
Self-Deluded Daisy: Daisy wants to skip her distant relative's birthday party on Saturday 
to instead play golf. She previously promised to go to the party, but at this point is no 
longer interested in attending. Still, Daisy does not want to be blameworthy for missing 
the party. So, she takes a drug on Friday that causes her to forget that she promised to 
attend. The next day she skips the party and plays golf with a clear conscience.  
 
It is relatively uncontroversial that Daisy is blameworthy for <taking the drug>. Some 
philosophers, however, also believe that Daisy is blameworthy for <skipping the party>. This 
verdict appears to conflict with BD. This is because, given her memory loss, Daisy’s <skipping 
the party> is subjectively permissible and we’ll stipulate that, on Saturday, Daisy acts only for 
the right reasons. Nevertheless, many find it intuitive that Daisy is blameworthy for <skipping 
the party> in virtue of her choice to take the drug yesterday. By accepting this claim, one is 
accepting that Daisy’s blameworthiness is traced back to her previous bad choice. Those who 
agree with this judgment must grant that BD is false and hold that, in certain cases, agents can be 
blameworthy for performing a subjectively permissible act for all of the right reasons and none 
of the wrong reasons.  
 
                                                 
21 For an excellent recent defense of tracing see Fischer and Tognazzini (2009). 
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To better understand how the tracing strategy can help the actualist, it will be useful to 
distinguish between direct and indirect blameworthiness, which we define as follows. 
  
Direct Blameworthiness: Agent S is directly blameworthy for φ-ing if she is (i) 
blameworthy for φ-ing and (ii) the blameworthiness for φ-ing does not trace back to 
previous acts.  
 
Indirect Blameworthiness: Agent S is indirectly blameworthy for φ-ing if she is (i) 
blameworthy for φ-ing and (ii) the blameworthiness for φ-ing does trace back to previous 
acts.22   
 
With this distinction in hand, we can formulate a version of BD that is consistent with tracing. 
 
BD*: Agent S is directly blameless for φ-ing if φ-ing is itself subjectively permissible and 
if S φs for all the right reasons and does not φ for any of the wrong reasons.  
Agent S is indirectly blameless for φ-ing iff there are no previous acts which S is directly 
blameworthy for performing to which φ-ing traces back.  
  
BD*’s implications for Torturing Tammy and Gamer Gabi depends on how we fill in the details. 
Specifically, it depends on whether Tammy and Gabi are culpable for certain facts. To illustrate, 
consider two ways of filling in Gabi's backstory.  
 
Traceable Gabi: Traceable Gabi is to blame for the fact that she would purchase the 
tablet tomorrow. She would purchase the tablet tomorrow because she has bad 
dispositions for which she is morally responsible for possessing. Her bad dispositions are 
the result of her repeatedly making selfish choices in the past. 
 
 Untraceable Gabi: Untraceable Gabi is not to blame for the fact that she would 
 purchase the tablet tomorrow.  
 
The actualist who replaces BD with BD* has the resources to say that Traceable Gabi is 
blameworthy for purchasing a tablet today because Traceable Gabi is indirectly blameworthy for 
purchasing the tablet despite the fact that doing so is subjectively permissible.23 To be sure, the 
actualist will still be unable to hold that Untraceable Gabi is blameworthy. However, the 
actualist should insist that the much of the motivation for judging that Gabi is blameworthy is 
due to the assumption that Gabi is responsible for the fact that she would buy a tablet tomorrow. 
Once we drop that assumption, it becomes more plausible that Gabi is not to blame. 
 
                                                 
22 This distinction is common in the literature. See, for example, Rosen (2004: 298-300) and Clark (2017: 235).  
23 Philosophers who reject tracing might still appeal to Traceable Gabi’s past selfish choices to explain away the intuition that she 
is blameworthy for purchasing the tablet. The fact that Traceable Gabi’s selfish choices would lead to her current circumstances 
might suggest that she is more blameworthy for those past choices than she otherwise would have been. This explains why we 
take her current behavior to be relevant to Gabi’s degree of blameworthiness (even though she is not, strictly speaking, 
blameworthy for purchasing the tablet). Thanks to David Brink and Andrew Forcehimes for suggesting this sort of approach. 
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Many will resonate with BD*’s verdict in Untraceable Gabi because it takes into account 
the fact that, unlike Traceable Gabi, Untraceable Gabi couldn’t have done anything to develop a 
better moral character than the one she, in fact, has. Although this is controversial, there is 
something attractive about the thought that Gabi is not blameworthy for minimizing the damage 
wrought by a moral character that she was herself powerless to improve.24 We grant that there is 
some lingering counterintuitiveness to the claim that Untraceable Gabi is not blameworthy for 
<purchasing a tablet today>. But it is much less implausible than the claim that Traceable Gabi 
is not blameworthy. Thus, actualists who accept tracing and reject BD in favor of BD* have, in 
our view, made considerable progress.   
 
VI: Actualism and Blameworthiness for Outcomes 
 
Actualism also faces a prima facie difficulty with respect to blameworthiness for outcomes (as 
opposed to actions). To illustrate, consider the following case.  
      
Self-Undermining Rescue: John is walking along the beach and sees a child drowning in 
the water. John believes that he could rescue the child without much effort. Due to his 
laziness, he decides not to attempt to rescue the child. The child drowns. Unbeknownst to 
John, if he had jumped into the water and begun swimming toward the child, it would 
have occurred to him that he was late for an appointment. John would have then freely 
decided to turn back to shore and he would not have rescued the child. 
 
In Self-Undermining Rescue it seems that John is blameworthy for the death of the child. 
Contrast that with cases that have the following structure.  
  
Sharks: John is walking along the beach and sees a child drowning in the water. John 
believes that he could rescue the child without much effort. Due to his laziness, he 
decides not to  attempt to rescue the child. The child drowns. Unbeknownst to John, there 
is a school of sharks hidden beneath the water. If John had jumped in and attempted to 
rescue the child, the sharks would have killed him and his rescue attempt would have 
been unsuccessful.25 
 
In Sharks it seems that John is not blameworthy for the death of the child. (Though, of course, he 
is blameworthy for not trying to save the child.) Our differing judgments in Self-Undermining 
Rescue and Sharks pose two related problems for actualism. 
 
                                                 
24 Some philosophers hold that agents can be directly blameworthy for possessing traits which they are powerless to 
avoid possessing (see e.g. Smith (2005)). On this view it is plausible that Untraceable Gabi does not get off the 
hook for purchasing the tablet because she cannot avoid possessing her bad character. For further discussion of this 
sort of issue, see Shoemaker (2015: chs 1 and 5). We are inclined to reject the claim that agents can be directly 
responsible for possessing traits which they are powerless to avoid. But defending our position here would be 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
25 This case is drawn from Fischer and Ravizza (1998: 125). 
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 First, actualism seems to imply that John’s refraining from jumping in is  (objectively) 
morally permissible in both cases. After all, things would not have turned out any better if John 
had jumped in and, we can stipulate, that it was not presently under John’s control to <jump in 
and save the child> in either case. Here’s the problem. If John’s omission is (objectively) 
permissible in Self-Undermining Rescue, then it is hard to see why he is blameworthy for the 
death of the child.  
 
 Second, unlike the sharks in Sharks, it seems unintuitive to treat John’s hypothetical 
future choice as an obstacle outside of his control. After all, John seems blameworthy for the 
death of the child in this case. Obstacles outside of one’s control should be held fixed when 
determining one’s blameworthiness (e.g. just as the presence of the sharks are held fixed when 
determining whether John is blameworthy for the death of the child in Sharks). Standard 
judgments in Self-Undermining Rescue and Sharks seem to fit better with the way possibilism 
treats future choices than it does with the way actualism treats future choices. In other words, 
possibilism can straightforwardly account for the asymmetric judgments in these two cases, 
while actualism cannot.  
 
How should actualists respond to these worries? They should begin by pointing out that, 
although John’s omission was objectively permissible, his omission was subjectively wrong in 
both cases. Again, subjective obligations pick out what a conscientious moral agent should do, 
relative to the evidence in her epistemic ken. Given that John believed that he would rescue the 
child if he jumped in the water, he was subjectively obligated to jump in the water. So, John acts 
subjectively wrongly in both cases. This explains why John is blameworthy for not jumping in 
and attempting a rescue in both cases. But what explains why he is intuitively blameworthy for 
the death of the child in Self-Undermining Rescue but not in Sharks?  
 
One option for the actualist is to again appeal to tracing. Perhaps the intuition that John is 
blameworthy for the death in Self-Undermining Rescue is based on the assumption that John is 
responsible for being the sort of person who would choose to allow a child to drown in order to 
be on time for an appointment. That is, John is responsible for the fact that his attempt to rescue 
the child in Self-Undermining Rescue would not succeed. In Sharks, however, John is not 
responsible for the fact that his attempt to rescue the child would not succeed. This may explain 
our differing intuitive judgments. If so, actualists can appeal to this difference between the cases 
to keep their view intact and avoid such counterintuitive consequences. 
    
Even with this promising strategy, the actualist isn’t completely immune from this  sort of 
objection. It is important to recognize that the tracing approach does not account for John’s 
responsibility for the death of the child in Self-Undermining Rescue if we stipulate that John is 
not responsible for the fact that he would have turned back. But, as with Gamer Gabi, we think 
that the actualist should claim that the reasons to think John is blameworthy for the death of the 
child are much stronger in the version of the case that allows for tracing. They could simply bite 
the (relatively small) bullet in the remaining cases.  
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Some actualists may not want to bite this bullet, however, and they needn’t do so. 
Actualists can account for John’s blameworthiness in versions of Self-Undermining Rescue 
where he is not responsible for the fact that he would have turned back in the following way. 
They can hold that John’s responsibility for the death of the child is explained by the fact that he 
could have performed a sequence of acts, each of which he would have been subjectively 
obligated to perform (had he performed each of the previous acts in the sequence) that would 
have resulted in the survival of the child. In Sharks, however, there is no sequence of acts that 
John could have performed (subjectively required or otherwise) that would have resulted in the 
survival of the child. More precisely, the actualist can endorse this principle.  
 
Blame For Outcomes: S is blameworthy for outcome O if (1) O occurs and is bad. (2), S 
meets the epistemic requirement for responsibility with regard to O. And (3) there is a 
sequence of acts such that (a) S was subjectively obligated to perform the first act in the 
sequence, (b) S would have been subjectively obligated to perform each act in the 
sequence if S had performed all previous acts in the sequence, and (c) performing all acts 
in this sequence would have prevented O. 
 
Blame For Outcomes is perfectly consistent with actualism and explains why John is 
blameworthy for the death of the child in Self-Undermining Rescue, but not in Sharks. It also 
seems to us to be independently plausible. For these reasons, we believe that the actualist should 
endorse it.  
 
 One might object that Blame For Outcomes is possibilist in spirit and that it is thus ad 
hoc for the actualist to endorse it. We want to resist this objection. The dispute between 
actualism and possibilism is so difficult, in part, because both views seem to be getting at 
something important about morality. So, each person should want the view they endorse to 
accommodate, so far as is possible, intuitive insights associated with the other view. The 
actualist can accommodate the intuitive judgment about Self-Undermining Rescue by endorsing 
Blame For Outcomes for principled reasons and we think they should do so. Although we think 
this is the route actualists should take, as we already mentioned, it remains open to the actualist 
to simply opt for the first strategy we outline and bite the bullet in the cases in which John is not 
responsible for the fact that he would have turned back.  
  
VII. Possibilism’s Blameworthiness Problem  
 
The best defense is a good offense. We will now go on the offensive on behalf of the 
actualist. The worry we raised for actualism is that it lets agents like Gabi and Tammy off the 
hook too easily. One might think that possibilism demands more from agents and thus will not be 
subject to this sort of worry. But, as we will now argue, possibilism also seems to let agents off 
the hook too easily. Possibilism can be specified to avoid letting agents off the hook too easily, 
but doing so causes possibilism to incur other non-trivial difficulties. Consider the case of Lazy 
Larry.  
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Lazy Larry: Larry believes that he will face a choice tomorrow between donating $500 
to save three lives or spending the money on himself. He believes that it is very important 
that he donate the $500. But he also believes that he will only donate the $500 if he 
spends the evening reading essays by Peter Singer. Otherwise, he will act on his desire to 
spend the money on himself. He believes that he could freely donate the money even if 
he does not read Singer, but he is confident that he would freely choose not to donate if 
he doesn’t read Singer. Unfortunately, Larry hates reading philosophy, but he loves 
playing video games. He also knows that playing video games will give his opponents a 
tiny bit of extra joy (one hedon), so he decides to spend the evening playing video games 
because he wants to do the morally right thing.26  
 
It seems quite obvious that Larry is blameworthy for not reading the Singer essays and he seems 
blameworthy regardless of whether he ends up donating the $500 to save the three lives. 
However, it is not easy for the possibilist to account for this. Given how displeasing Larry finds 
philosophy and the benefit that results from his playing video games, it looks as the though the 
best act-set Larry could perform is <spend the evening playing video games and donate the $500 
tomorrow>. 
 
Thus according to possibilism, Larry is (subjectively and objectively) obligated to refrain 
from reading philosophy. So, it is hard to see how he could be blameworthy for refraining. One 
initial move the possibilist might make would be to agree that, according to possibilism, Larry is 
not to blame for not reading the Singer essays, but claim that this is not a problem for possibilism 
because Larry will be highly blameworthy soon enough. Once tomorrow rolls around and Larry 
fails to donate, he will be blameworthy. Thus, the possibilist might claim, possibilism does not 
let Larry off the hook too easily.   
 
 We think that there is still a cost in denying that Larry is blameworthy for <not reading 
the Singer essays> even if he is still blameworthy for <failing to donate $500 tomorrow>. But 
there is a deeper problem for the possibilist here. Suppose that Larry's beliefs about tomorrow 
are mistaken. Unbeknownst to him, when he is faced with the choice tomorrow, he will muster 
up enough willpower to avoid succumbing to akrasia and donate the $500 to save the three lives. 
Given this, possibilists and actualists will agree that Larry is objectively permitted to spend the 
evening playing video games. They will only disagree about whether it is subjectively 
permissible to do so. Possibilists will hold that Larry is subjectively obligated to play video 
games, while actualists will hold that Larry is subjectively obligated to read Singer.  
 
                                                 
26 The worry we raise based on Lazy Larry is related to a potential problem for possibilism which Smith (2014: 20) 
suggests in a footnote. She writes that possibilism “seems ill equipped to generate appropriate duties to gather 
information. Since...many...agents faced with a decision whether or not to acquire more information [are]  able—
whether or not [they]  investigate...—to do the right thing in the future, a possibilistic version of the duty to 
investigate would not generate any objective duty for [them] to gather evidence.”  
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As noted earlier, we initially formulated possibilism in terms of objective obligations. 
However, it can be formulated in terms of subjective obligations too. Here is one such 
formulation.    
 
Subjective Possibilism: At t an agent S is subjectively obligated to φ at t' iff (i) S 
believes she can φ at t' and (ii) S believes that φ-ing at t' is part of the best series of acts 
that S can perform from t to the last moment that, at t, S can possibly perform an act.27  
 
On subjective possibilism, Larry is subjectively permitted to refrain from reading Singer 
even though he (falsely) believes that he will save three lives if and only if he reads Singer. Thus, 
it looks as though BD entails that he is blameless, and this is the incorrect result. Note that the 
possibilist cannot take solace in the claim that Larry will eventually be blameworthy for failing 
to donate since Larry won’t necessarily fail to donate the money.  
 
Perhaps the possibilist should insist that Larry is to blame for not reading Singer even 
though doing so was permissible. This would allow the possibilist to avoid the charge of letting 
Larry off the hook too easily, but it would require them to reject BD. (They would have to reject 
BD* as well as since Larry’s situation need not trace back to any previous blameworthy acts on 
his part). On this approach, Larry is blameworthy for playing video games, not because playing 
video games is itself impermissible, but because performing this permissible act would 
seemingly result in Larry performing a deeply impermissible act in the future, one that is worse 
than the trivially impermissible act he would seemingly have to perform to avoid the future 
wrongdoing. The possibilist could amend BD as follows to accommodate this judgment. The 
underlined words highlight the differences between this formulation of BD and the original 
formulation.       
  
BD**: Agent S is blameless for φ-ing if φ-ing is itself subjectively permissible and will 
(relative to the agent’s evidence) only result in S performing subjectively permissible acts 
and if S φs for all the right reasons and does not φ for any of the wrong reasons. 
  
We think rejecting BD in favor of BD** (and saying Larry is blameworthy for his 
permissible act) may be the best recourse for the possibilist, but it does raise serious difficulties 
for the view. First, it threatens to commit the possibilist to the existence of blame dilemmas. 
Suppose that Larry ends up choosing to read Singer. Should the possibilist say that Larry is also 
blameworthy for reading Singer? If they say yes, then they commit themselves to the existence 
of blame dilemmas. Larry is blameworthy whether or not he reads Singer. This may not seem so 
counterintuitive if Larry is in a self-imposed blame dilemma (e.g. being required to fulfill two 
incompatible promises freely made). But that needn’t be the case, as Larry need not be at fault 
for being in his current situation. This version of possibilism could allow agents to be in world-
imposed blame dilemmas.  
 
                                                 
27 Some philosophers prefer to formulate subjective obligations in terms of what S's evidence supports or what S 
“should believe” rather than in terms of what S actually believes. Our objection to possibilism would not be 
substantially effected by switching to an evidential support account of subjective obligation.   
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Suppose instead that the possibilist says that Larry is not to blame if he reads Singer. 
They are then endorsing a very odd claim, viz. Larry is blameworthy if he does what is 
subjectively permissible (playing video games) and blameless if does what is subjectively wrong 
(reading Singer). More generally, they commit themselves to the following. 
 
Blameworthy Right Action & Blameless Wrong Action: An agent S can be in a 
circumstance where S would be blameworthy for fulfilling their subjective moral 
obligation (for the right reasons) and blameless for freely violating their subjective 
obligations.  
 
We find this consequence quite counterintuitive. It is especially strange because Larry does not 
seem to have an excuse for doing what is subjectively wrong (i.e. reading Singer). So why isn't 
he blameworthy for performing the subjectively wrong action?  
 
So, we see three viable options for the possibilist: (1) bite the bullet and deny that Larry 
is blameworthy for playing video games, (2) accept world-imposed blame dilemmas, (3) accept 
Blameworthy Right Action & Blameless Wrong Action. Each of these have obvious costs. 
 
In our view, the best option for the possibilist is (2).  They should replace BD with BD** 
and commit themselves to world-imposed blame dilemmas. While this is the best (or least bad) 
strategy for the possibilist, it still comes at a non-trivial cost for the view, one which we think 
illustrates that possibilism is subject to its own blameworthiness problem on a par with 
actualism’s blameworthiness problem.   
  
Conclusion  
 
We sought to establish a few related theses in this paper. We first illustrated that existing 
forms of actualism, coupled with BD, are unable to straightforwardly account for why agents 
such as Gamer Gabi are blameworthy for their actions. We then offered two independent 
solutions on behalf on the actualist, each with their own advantages and limits. First, one could 
adopt an explicitly contextualist form of actualism, thereby allowing actualists to hold that agents 
such as Gabi do violate BD. The second option for the actualist is to adopt an account of tracing 
that will allow them to account for such agent’s blameworthiness in cases in which these agents 
are responsible for their rotten moral dispositions.  
 
In the next section, we demonstrated that actualism also has difficultly straightforwardly 
accommodating plausible judgments about blameworthiness for outcomes. Specifically, it has 
trouble accommodating the asymmetrical judgments between Self-Undermining Rescue and 
Sharks. We again offered two solutions on behalf of the actualist. First, we applied the tracing 
strategy outlined in the previous section to show how it offers a parallel solution to this problem. 
Second, we demonstrated that adopting our Blame for Outcomes principle allows actualists to 
accommodate these asymmetrical judgements.  
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In the last section, we went on the offensive, and argued that possibilism, coupled with 
BD, has trouble straightforwardly accounting for why agents such as Lazy Larry are 
blameworthy for their actions. In light of our case, the possibilist will have to either (1) bite the 
bullet (2) commit themselves to world-imposed blame dilemmas or (3) accept Blameworthy 
Right Action & Blameless Wrong Action. We suggested that (2) is the best recourse for the 
possibilist. Our arguments should collectively provide reason to believe that, contrary to initial 
appearances, actualism may be able to adequately accommodate the highly plausible 
blameworthiness desiderata discussed in this paper.28   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 For very helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper, we wish to thank Sean Aas, Marius Baumann, Gunnar 
Björnsson, David Brink, Justin Coates, Julia Driver, Andrew Forcehimes, Camil Golub, Elizabeth Harman, Matthew 
Hammerton, Robert MacDougall, August Gorman, Thaddeus Metz, Collin O’Neil, Doug Portmore, Luke Semrau, 
David Shoemaker, Michael Smith, Stephen White, two anonymous referees, the audience at the Neutrality: Reasons, 
Values, and Times conference at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, and the audience at the New 
Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR). Work on this paper was funded by summer grants 
from The College of William & Mary and Seton Hall University, as well as a grant from the National Endowment 
for the Humanities.  
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